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THE ALI PRINCIPLES AND MARITAL QUALITY
ALLEN M. PARKMAN*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Most adult Americans believe that having a successful marriage and family
life is very important, yet many of them fail in their attempts.  A subtle, but im-
portant reason for their failures is the laws governing the dissolution of mar-
riage.1  The combination of unilateral, no-fault grounds for divorce with finan-
cial arrangements at divorce—that usually disregard the effect of marriage on
the spouses income earning capacities (human capital)—have encouraged
spouses to be more concerned about their own self-interest and less concerned
about their family’s welfare.  Recognizing the adverse financial effects of divorce
on some ex-spouses, the American Law Institute promulgated its Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution (Principles).2  The Principles have the stated goal of
achieving an equitable sharing of the losses, while controlling spousal negotia-
tions in the event of marital dissolution.3  The couple’s financial conditions at
dissolution are certainly a problem, but a more important concern with regard
to marriage is how to encourage spouses to make decisions during marriage that
are based on their family’s welfare, rather than focusing on their own narrowly
defined self-interest.  Some aspects of the Principles are helpful in achieving this
goal; others are detrimental.
While the Principles are written in gender-free language, increasing the
quality of marriages may be of particular concern to women.  First, while wives
are more likely than husbands to eventually become disillusioned with mar-
riage,4 women initially tend to place a stronger emphasis on the importance of a
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1. See generally ALLEN M. PARKMAN, GOOD INTENTIONS GONE AWRY: NO-FAULT DIVORCE AND
THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2000) (contains an analysis of the effect of no-fault divorce).
2. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
4.02 (Proposed Final Draft Part I, 1997) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES 1997].  This article only addresses
the financial arrangements recommended in the Principles in Chapter 4 (Division of Property Upon
Dissolution) and in Chapter 5 (Compensatory Spousal Payments).
3. See id. at xiii.
4. There is strong evidence from the National Survey of Families and Households that wives
are more likely than husbands to initiate divorce.  A majority of the wives who divorced between the
two phases of the Survey in 1988 and 1992-93 indicated that they initiated the divorce and there was
a high level of agreement from their husbands.  See PARKMAN, supra note 1, at 110.  Moreover, the
Survey provides some insights as to why the wives became disillusioned with their marriage.  When
asked questions about the affection and understanding that they were getting from their spouse, the
responses of the wives indicated that they were much more unhappy with those aspects of their
marriage than did the responses of the husbands.  Id. at 111.
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successful marriage than do men.5  Second, the increased specialization that
commonly occurs during marriage often causes the lower-income spouse—usu-
ally the wife—to increase her emphasis on domestic work.  This emphasis,
which is particularly apparent when a couple has children, can adversely affect
the lower-income spouse’s future income if the marriage is dissolved.6  There-
fore, it is particularly important to women that the change in a spouse’s income-
earning capacity during marriage be recognized and compensated if there is a
divorce.  Knowing that there is protection for sacrifices in earning power can en-
courage domestic activities, thereby potentially increasing the quality of mar-
riage and reducing the likelihood of divorce.
The remainder of this commentary will discuss the dynamics that encour-
aged the development of the Principles, the gains from commitment and spe-
cialization during marriage, and the factors that encourage these actions.  Fi-
nally, this commentary evaluates the Principles in terms of their ability to
encourage commitment and specialization.
Initially, we need to understand why the American Law Institute identified
the need to modify the current financial arrangements at divorce.  While there
have been dramatic changes in the grounds for divorce, as fault grounds have
given way to no-fault in all jurisdictions, there have only been minor changes in
the financial arrangements at divorce.7  The terms “fault” and “no-fault” are
somewhat misleading as the critical change occurred from divorce being com-
monly based on the mutual consent of the spouses to its being available to either
spouse unilaterally.  Fault divorce often resulted in dissolutions based on mu-
tual consent because the fault grounds of adultery, desertion or cruelty were dif-
ficult to establish.  Consequently, most divorces in that era were the result of ne-
gotiations between the spouses who were able to ignore the statutes governing
the financial arrangements.  The divorcing spouse had to come up with a pack-
age of concessions to induce the cooperation of the other spouse.  The initially
unwilling spouse could be persuaded to cooperate—although not necessarily
enthusiastically—if the concessions covered the anticipated financial and emo-
5. According to the Monitoring the Future Survey conducted by the Institute for Social Re-
search at the University of Michigan, female high school seniors are ten percent more likely to say
that having a good marriage and family life is extremely important than are male high school sen-
iors.  In 1999, the response by females was 83 percent, while for males it was 74 percent.  U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, TRENDS IN THE WELL-BEING OF AMERICA’S
CHILDREN AND YOUTH 175 (2000).  Barbara Dafoe Whitehead and David Popenoe report similar re-
sults from their focus group discussions with never-married adults in their twenties.  Women
ranked marriage higher on their personal goals than did men.  Barbara Dafoe Whitehead & David
Popenoe, Why Wed: Young Adults Talk About Sex, Love and First Unions, in THE NAT’L MARRIAGE
PROJECT (Jan. 1999), available at http://marriage.rutgers.edu/pubwhywe.htm.
6. Being a housewife and mother has a detrimental effect on the earnings of women who con-
tinue to work during marriage.  See Joni Hersch & Leslie S. Stratton, Housework, Fixed Effects, and
Wages of Married Women, 32 J. HUM. RESOURCES 285, 286 (1997).  The long-term effect on the earnings
of married women who leave the labor force is more pronounced.  See Leslie S. Stratton, The Effect
Interruptions in Work Experience Have on Wages, 61 S. ECON. J. 955, 956 (1995).
7. Between 1969 and 1985, all states either replaced the fault grounds of adultery, desertion
and cruelty with no-fault grounds of irretrievable breakdown or incompatibility or added the no-
fault grounds to the existing fault grounds.  PARKMAN, supra note 1, at ix.
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tional costs of divorce.8  For example, in a community property state, a spouse
could demand substantially more than the equal division of property provided
for by law, in order to be persuaded to cooperate in a divorce.  Since the couples
ignored the applicable statutes, few inquired as to whether the legally-
prescribed financial arrangements at divorce were necessarily just and fair.
Conditions changed with the introduction of no-fault divorce in most juris-
dictions. As divorces became available unilaterally to either spouse, the need for
negotiations was dramatically reduced. An unwilling spouse could seldom ex-
pect financial arrangements at trial that differed substantially from those pre-
scribed by law.  These laws generally provided for a sharing of marital property
and potentially some short-term spousal support.  A particular problem with
those laws was that the financial arrangements tended to ignore the effect of
marriage on the spouses’ income earning capacities.  The reduction in human
capital that occurred when female spouses limited a career during marriage re-
sulted in many divorced women and their children facing dire financial condi-
tions following divorce.9  The Principles respond to this problem by attempting
to shift resources to the spouse with the lower income at divorce.
II.  THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE BEST INTERESTS OF A SPOUSE AND THE FAMILY
The financial arrangements at divorce are important because a successful
marriage is partly based on pragmatic considerations.  In addition to love and
physical attraction, marriages benefit from spouses making decisions based on
their family’s best interests rather than on a narrow concern for their own wel-
fare.  Still, there is strong evidence that individuals’ own self-interest has a cen-
tral role in their decisions.10  One key, therefore, to a successful marriage is an
incentive structure that encourages spouses to recognize that personal self-
interest is best served by addressing the concerns of other family members, es-
pecially their spouses. Self-sacrifice in the family’s service will only be rationally
incurred when other family members provide corresponding benefits.
Often these sacrifices are associated with the spouses assuming more spe-
cialized roles in marriage. A spouse specializing in income production will still
have those income earning skills in tact even if the marriage dissolves. A spouse
specializing in domestic work may develop skills which have less value in an-
other relationship and little value in the labor force.  Still, domestic work is an
important complement to earnings and it produces goods and services that ul-
timately increase the welfare of the family members.  The family benefits from
well-mannered and happy children, good meals and the like.  While many of
these services can be purchased from others, often the family may be more satis-
fied with the quality provided by family members (especially of childcare).
8. Since no court is capable of quantifying the emotional costs of divorce, mutual consent is a
far better ground for divorce of established marriages than no-fault.  See id. at 188.
9. Lenore Weitzman reported that divorce resulted in a 42 percent increase in the welfare of
men and 73 percent decline in the welfare of women.  LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE
REVOLUTION 323 (1985).  Others questioned the magnitude of the effect and when Richard Peterson
re-analyzed Weitzman’s data, he concluded the effects of divorce, while dramatic, were less sub-
stantial—a 27 percent decline for women and a 10 percent increase for men. See Richard R. Peterson,
A Re-Evaluation of the Economic Consequences of Divorce, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 528, 532 (1995).
10. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (2d. ed. 2001).
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To encourage the sacrifices in earning capacity often associated with do-
mestic work, those sacrifices should be recognized as the basis for compensation
if the marriage is dissolved.  Spouses are encouraged to make these sacrifices
based on the expectation that benefits will follow, either from reciprocal acts by
other family members or, at least, from legal safeguards if the marriage is dis-
solved.  While altruism can be a pertinent force in close relationships, the ex-
pectation of present and future benefits provides a strong incentive for making
these sacrifices.  The essence of marriage consists of reciprocal arrangements.
While neither washing the family car by one spouse nor cooking dinner by the
other will necessarily result in positive net benefits for that person, the combi-
nation of activities will result in positive net benefits for the couple.  Neither ac-
tivity is done in isolation, but each is done in anticipation of the other.  A car
wash and a meal are activities that are reasonably contemporaneous, so the
spouses need not be concerned about whether the reciprocal actions will occur.
However, other benefits may occur long after the costs were incurred, such as
instances where educational support is provided by a spouse.  The providing
spouses are more likely to incur these costs if there is a reasonable assurance
that they will be compensated.
If the likelihood increases that compensation will not be received for sacri-
fices, then spouses are discouraged from making welfare-enhancing decisions
for which the benefits exceed the costs.11  For example, a couple may recognize
that their children would benefit from one parent limiting a career to provide
important childcare services.  However, that parent may be reluctant to incur
the potential cost of limiting a career if he or she is not confident that the other
spouse and the children will provide financial and emotional compensation.
This lack of compensation can be due to the lack of systematic recognition for
past incurred costs in financial and custodial arrangements following divorce.12
As a consequence, the parents may intensify their focus on their careers to the
detriment of themselves and their children.
It is important that these earning capacity sacrifices be recognized at dis-
solution and incorporated in the property settlement.  Since these sacrifices were
incurred for the benefit of the family, they should be recognized as material
debts which, in other contexts, are commonly recognized as property.13  A prop-
erty settlement may consist of a lump sum payment (when sufficient assets are
available) or specific future payments.  The predictability of these property set-
tlements is preferable to modifiable and terminable periodic payments, such as
11. Because no-fault divorce permits unilateral divorce often accompanied by limited financial
compensation for women who have limited their careers to benefit their families, married women
have been forced to take steps to protect themselves from the potential adverse effects of divorce.
Since they are acting in their best interest rather than that of their families, this lack of protection for
their investments often induces them to make inefficient decisions for their families because the
benefits do not exceed the costs.  See Allen M. Parkman, Why Are Married Women Working So Hard?,
18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 41, 43-44 (1998).
12. Allen M. Parkman, Unilateral Divorce and the Labor-Force Participation Rate of Married Women,
Revisited, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 671, 672 (1992).
13. While only sacrificed careers are discussed here, there are other debts that should be recog-
nized at divorce.  These include those associated with investments in enhancing a spouse’s human
capital through education.  See generally Allen M. Parkman, Bringing Consistency to the Financial Ar-
rangements at Divorce, 87 KY. L.J. 51 (1998-99).
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alimony or spousal support.  Modifiable and terminable payments encourage
ex-spouses to make choices based on their effect on payments rather than mak-
ing decisions which would otherwise be in their best interests.  For example, ex-
spouses receiving support payments have an incentive to not aggressively es-
tablish a career or remarry because these actions will reduce or terminate their
payments.  These perverse incentives can be avoided with a fixed award at di-
vorce.
III.  REFORMS BY THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
In evaluating the Principles, a key consideration is whether its provisions
recognize and compensate divorcing spouses who have made sacrifices for the
benefit of their families. The Principles lack consistency by only indirectly ad-
dressing sacrifices during marriage and ignoring the analysis of human capital
(giving periodic compensatory payments a central role).  The financial arrange-
ments at divorce are addressed in Chapter 4 (Division of Property Upon Disso-
lution) and Chapter 5 (Compensatory Spousal Payments). It is important to ap-
preciate that the laws governing the grounds for divorce and the financial
arrangements at divorce have subtle, but important effects on the quality of on-
going marriages.  The financial arrangements are not just important for those
who divorce but also for those who stay married, in part because those spouses
are encouraged to invest in their marriage thereby increasing its quality and
hopefully their satisfaction with it.
A. Property
The Principles define marital and separate property, but not property itself
when considering the division of property upon the dissolution of marriage.14
The Principles assume that traditionally-recognized marital property should be
divided equally,15 except when there is financial misconduct.16  The Principles do
not provide a definition of “marital property” stating, “. . .if the term was meant
to have a special meaning different from its meaning in other areas of the law,
but no such special definition is necessary or desirable.  The most frequent occa-
sion for debate over the definition involves the law’s treatment of earning ca-
pacity and goodwill, but the characterization of these assets involves policy
choices whose analysis is not aided by appeal to a general definition of property.
The definition of marital property must follow from the policy choice; the policy
choice is not determined by the definition.”17
The failure to define marital property to include human capital is a short-
coming because human capital, in contrast to other forms of property, is not
marketable. Marital property is just another term for what economists and fi-
nancial analysts refer to as assets.  Assets have value because of their ability to
provide future returns to their owner.  The services of a house, the interest on a
bond and the dividends on a share of stock are the returns that give those assets
14. See ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 2, § 4.02 cmt. a.
15. Id. § 4.15 cmt. b.
16. See id. § 4.16.
17. Id.
PARKMAN - FMT.DOC 09/06/01  3:00 PM
162 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 8:157 2001
value.  Moreover, these assets have a market value because they can be sold in
markets.  While human capital also provides future returns in the form of earn-
ings, it differs from other assets because of its lack of marketability.  In other
words, the services resulting from human capital can be sold, although the asset
itself—the person—cannot be sold.  Even so, marriage can affect its value, just as
marriage can affect the value of other assets owned by the spouses.  A major
omission in state law is the lack of recognition that human capital should be in-
cluded in the property divided at divorce.  The ALI had an opportunity to cor-
rect that omission in the Principles and it elected not to do so.
Under fault divorce laws, a clear definition of property was less important
because spouses could negotiate their own financial arrangements.  Now that
statutes play a central role in determining the financial outcomes at divorce, a
clear definition is becoming increasingly important.  It is not an acceptable con-
clusion that the law’s treatment of earning capacity and goodwill, for example,
should be based on policy choices.  If an object is an asset and considered prop-
erty, then the object should be recognized as such with the normal standards for
its identification and valuation.
Public choices may then determine whether there are reasons for modify-
ing the general rules for the allocation of property at divorce.  For example,
much of the confusion about how earning capacity and professional goodwill18
should be treated at divorce is due to the lack of a clear definition and under-
standing of property, especially human capital. This lack of clarity is easily
remedied using the language of the financial and economic analysts who usu-
ally identify and value property.
This omission is a particular problem for women.  Human capital can in-
crease or decrease due to choices made during marriage.  While the courts have
often been concerned about the higher-income spouses—usually husbands—
who leave a marriage with their income intact, often those spouses are earning
an income that they would have earned even without this marriage.  In other
words, the marriage did not affect that spouse’s human capital.  The subtler—
but much more common—injustice occurs when a spouse leaves a marriage
with a potential income less than they would have had if they had not married
or at least not limited their career during marriage.  The spouse’s human capital
has been reduced due to this marriage.  The Principles does not recognize this
change in their assets in a systematic manner.
If we view marriage as a partnership, the Principles’ framework of dividing
marital property and returning separate property has a basic appeal.  Because
the Principles do not clearly define property, they do not address the effect of
marriage on the spouses’ human capital.  The recharacterization of separate
property as marital property goes beyond current rules on transmutation and
lacks a logical basis.19  This requirement seems unnecessary since a rebuttable
presumption of commingling or transmutation will usually result in some of the
parties’ separate property becoming marital property, except when the spouses
18. See generally Allen M. Parkman, A Systematic Approach to Valuing the Goodwill of Professional
Practices, in VALUING PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES AND LICENSE 6-1, 6-4 (Ronald L. Brown ed., 1998)
(discussion of professional goodwill).
19. See ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 2, § 4.18.
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take deliberate steps to avoid that change.20  If access to another person’s sepa-
rate property is a motivating factor in choosing to marry, then the parties should
be forced to recognize that reality rather than have the law create a presumption
that the separate property has become marital property during a long-duration
marriage.
B. Compensatory Payments
The primary concern of the Principles is the equitable sharing of the losses
from the dissolution of a marriage.  Because women have frequently been the
victims of these losses, the Principles are an improvement over current laws for
them. Nonetheless, a primary basis for the compensation provided under the
Principles is periodic payments, which—while having an aura of fairness—can
be unfair and inefficient.21  The Principles have rejected including intangible as-
sets such as spousal earning capacity among the items considered in property
settlements, rather assigning their relevance to be considered as compensatory
payments.22  Some awards are fixed at dissolution, while others can be modified
and terminated with remarriage or death.23
These payments would provide compensation for: 1) a reduction in living
standard in long-duration marriages in earning capacity due to childcare or care
for a third party; and 2) investment in the other spouse’s earning capacity. Ad-
ditionally, compensatory payments may assist a spouse in recovering her pre-
marital standard of living after the dissolution of a short marriage.24
Compensation for investments in the other spouse’s earning capacity and
payments which assist a spouse in recovering her premarital living standard af-
ter the dissolution of a short marriage cannot be modified and do not terminate
with remarriage or death.25  An award based on these factors can be made in the
form of an enhanced share of the marital property, a lump sum payment from
separate property or a set term of monthly payments.26  Both the logic behind
and provision for a lump sum payment would justify treating these forms of
compensation as part of the property settlement.  Reimbursement for invest-
ments in the other spouse’s human capital is not only fair, but it also encourages
these critical investments.  While the lack of compensation for these investments
has often been viewed as a particular problem for women, the increase in the
number of women pursuing higher education has made this a concern for both
genders.27
20. See generally HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
596 (2d ed. 1988).
21. See ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 2, §§ 5.01-02.
22. Id. § 4.07(1) cmt. a.
23. Id. § 5.08.
24. Id. § 5.03.
25. Id. § 5.17.
26. Id.
27. In 1995, 56 percent of students in higher education were women.  See U. S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 164 (1999).  The growth in the percentage of
professional degrees conferred on women has increased rapidly with the percentage of medical de-
grees growing from 8 percent in 1970 to 41 percent in 1996, and the percentage of law degrees in-
creased from 5 percent to 44 percent over the same period. Id. at 206.
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Recovering a premarital living standard is another application of human
capital.  At marriage, individuals have human capital based on their future in-
come stream that reflects prior—and potentially future—investments in educa-
tion and experience.  The couple may decide that they would benefit from a
spouse leaving his or her current job to either relocate or increase their emphasis
on domestic work.  There is an expectation that family welfare will be improved
by this action.  While the person leaving the paid workforce—frequently the
wife—should be compensated if the marriage is for a short duration, this ap-
proach, while ignored by the Principles, is also appropriate for longer-duration
marriages. Lacking a consistent framework, the Principles do not appreciate that
an application of § 5.16 (Restoration of Premarital Living Standard After a Short
Marriage) to longer marriages would eliminate the need to consider the issues
addressed in § 5.05 (Compensation for Loss of Marital Living Standard) and §
5.06 (Compensation for Primary Caretaker’s Residual Loss in Earning Capacity).
The financial loss experienced by a spouse due to the dissolution of this mar-
riage is the difference between the income that she can now anticipate and the
income that she would be earning if they had never married.28  This loss will be
due to a variety of choices made during marriage including those associated
with care for children and parents.
Because the Principles do not recognize the potentially broad application of
Section 5.16, compensatory spousal payments are also provided for a loss in
living standard after a long- duration marriage, or a loss in earning capacity due
to caring for others.  Again, these provisions are expected to shift additional
funds to women at divorce.  These payments end with remarriage or death29 and
can be modified.30  Compensation is based on a sharing of the spouses’ post-
dissolution incomes, although the income transfer often has only a limited link
to the sacrifices made or losses incurred.31  The Principles do not provide a logical
reason why ex-spouses’ incomes should be shared just because they were mar-
ried, even when there is no discernable sacrifice involved.32  Working at home
during marriage is only a basis for these payments if the couple has children33 or
the marriage is for a long duration.34
While modifiable and terminable income sharing after divorce has a fun-
damental appeal, it is a poor structure for the financial arrangements at di-
28. This is a loss based on reliance.  See generally Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance
Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62 TULANE L. REV. 855 (1988).
29. See ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 2, § 5.08.
30. Id. § 5.09.
31. Id. § 5.05-.06.
32. See J. Thomas Oldham, ALI Principles of Family Dissolution: Some Comments, 1997 U. ILL. L.
REV. 801, 815 (1997).  If we view a divorce as the breach of a marriage agreement, the PRINCIPLES
provides a remedy based on the expectation at the end of the marriage rather than even the expecta-
tion at the beginning of the marriage.  Even if one wants to use an expectation framework rather
than the reliance one suggested here, the expectation should be based on the parties’ expectation at
marriage. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 130 (5th ed.
1998)(discussion of contract remedies).
33. See ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 2, § 5.06 cmt. a.
34. Id. § 5.06.
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vorce.35  It encourages people to make decisions based on the effect on their
payments, rather than addressing those choices that are in their best interest
without regard to the payments.  First, it creates disincentives for ex-spouses to
seek their best employment opportunity since they will have to share their in-
come with their ex-spouse.  The Principles want to ignore one of the most basic
aspects of human nature—self-interest.  Each dollar earned by either ex-spouse
must be shared with the other, creating a disincentive for the other ex-spouse to
earn that dollar.  While the reaction of the higher-income spouse may be more
obvious, the effect on the lower-income spouse may be more important because
their potential income is not evident at divorce.  The pre-dissolution income of
the higher-income party is probably a fair estimate of his or her potential in-
come.  Any deviation from that level could be the basis for judicial sanctions.
Although previously the lower-income spouse often sought more flexible em-
ployment for the benefit of their family, that spouse now often has to pursue less
attractive but higher paying employment.  Since any increase in the income of
the lower-income spouse will reduce the compensation from their ex-spouse,
she has a disincentive to make these choices.  Often this will work to her detri-
ment because less attractive, more challenging jobs often provide training and
experience that is important for higher paying and more rewarding jobs later.
Since wives tend to be the spouses with the lower income after divorce, this
provision reduces their incentive to reestablish a career.
Some of the periodic payments end with remarriage or cohabitation, so the
spouse receiving them has less incentive to attempt to establish a new relation-
ship.  Since the recipients of the payments are more likely to be women, this
provision also works to their detriment.  Remarriage does not affect the obliga-
tions of the higher-income party, which will often be the husband, imposing no
new penalty on them if they elect to remarry or cohabitate.  Finally, women will
often be adversely affected because there are the inevitable problems associated
with collecting periodic payments that could have been avoided if more of the
financial transfer had been completed through a property settlement at the time
of the divorce.
Not only do the Principles encourage inefficient decisions, but numerous
injustices are likely to occur because an analysis of earnings and sacrifices is not
considered.  These injustices will tend to be randomly distributed among men
and women.  Most notably, there is a lack of understanding of the basis for dif-
ferent earnings.  Among workers with similar attributes, those willing to work
harder and accept jobs with fewer attractive attributes tend to have higher
earnings.  Consequently, it can be unfair to force a higher paid ex-spouse to sub-
sidize a lower paid ex-spouse.  Secondly, injustices will occur because sacrifices
are not considered.  Long-duration marriages would result in compensatory
payments regardless of whether there were sacrifices during the marriage.  A
spouse may have left the labor force not so much to emphasize domestic work
as to obtain a more leisurely life.  This person will receive the same transfers as a
spouse who made significant career sacrifices to provide valuable services in the
home.
35. See Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1117
(1989)(discusses another rationale for income sharing after divorce).
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There also can be important sacrifices before marriage.  Parties who made
numerous sacrifices before marriage to acquire important income earning skills
(such as a medical education) may be forced to share their income with parties
who did not make similar sacrifices either before or during marriage.  Moreover,
if a spouse limits a career to provide important services in the home and that
loss is recognized at dissolution as the basis for compensatory payments, it will
not disappear even if the person remarries (when the Principles would normally
terminate compensation).
Injustices will also occur because the Principles assume that the lower-
income earning spouse only deserves compensation if that person’s income is
substantially below that of the other spouse.  If the primary caretaker does not
have an income that is substantially less than the other spouse, she will receive
no compensation for any reduction in her future income due to her working in
the home.36  With the increase in women with substantial education, the likeli-
hood has increased that women who assumed primary responsibility for child-
care will be able to return to the labor force at an income that would not qualify
them for compensation, even though their income is less that they would have
made if they had not assumed domestic responsibilities.  Maintaining the ad hoc
nature of the law in this area, the Principles notes that it is contrary to existing
law for the lower-income spouse to compensate the higher-income spouse even
when it is the higher-income spouse who incurred a sacrifice because of the
marriage. 37  While the Principles permit couples to contract around these provi-
sions, 38 experience has shown that people are reluctant to contract over emo-
tional relationships such as marriage.
IV.  CONCLUSION
The financial arrangements at divorce should encourage spouses to con-
sider all family members during marriage.  This is most likely to occur if the
spouses know that they will be compensated for sacrifices that reduce their in-
come-earning capacity.  The Principles provide compensation for some of those
sacrifices, such as investing in a spouse or limiting career options in a short-
duration marriage.  However, other provisions in the Principles do not link com-
pensation to sacrifices.  Considering the effect of marriage on the spouses’ hu-
man capital, incorporating this factor in the property settlement is particularly
important to women because of their concern for successful marriages and the
sacrifices that they frequently make for their family’s benefit.
36. See ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 2, § 5.06(2)(c).
37. Id. § 5.06 cmt. d.
38. Id. § 5.01 cmt. b.
